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1 Introduction
At the end of the 1960’s, economic research began to deal increasingly with the
importance of infrastructure for economic development. Early studies e.g. Frey
(1970), Jochimsen (1966), Jochimsen and Simonis (1970) or Simonis (1977) dealt
especially with the theoretical aspects of infrastructure provision and infrastruc-
ture’s conceptual basis.
Since the end of the 1980’s, there has been greater interest also in empirical in-
frastructure research. By using production function approaches, the direct and in-
direct effect of improvements in infrastructure on private productivity have been
estimated. The studies by Aschauer (1988; 1989a; 1989b) have not only raised the
attention of scientists but have also had an effect on economic policy. As a re-
sult, spending on public infrastructure in the US increased considerably during
President Clinton’s first term of office (Gramlich, 1994).
For the period 1949-1985, Aschauer (1989a) reports a significant elasticity of
output with respect to public non-military capital between 0.38 and 0.56 for the
US using aggregated time series data. Thus the estimated marginal productivity
of public capital in this study considerably exceeded that of private capital. This
finding implies that returns resulting from public investment were higher than
those arising from private investment projects.
Turning to the hypothetical effects of infrastructure, Aschauer (1995), for ex-
ample, postulates that public capital can have both a direct and indirect effect on
private output. The direct effect arises because changes in public capital stock
alter the level of output by making private labour and capital inputs more or less
productive. The indirect effect arises because an increase in public capital stock
will affect the marginal products of labour and private capital, which in turn in-
fluence the chosen quantities of private inputs.
Furthermore, Aschauer advances the theory that the up to 60 percent of the
decrease of productivity growth in the USA during the 1970’s and 1980’s can be
attributed to the cut-back in public infrastructure investment during this period.
However, some economists have voiced doubts about the plausibility of the
results of Aschauer’s studies (Aaron, 1990; Gramlich, 1994; Hulten and Schwab,
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1991; Jorgenson, 1991; Tatom, 1991a). One criticism is the high degree of aggre-
gation of the data used by Aschauer. Therefore, more recent research works have
examined the effects of infrastructure on regionally more disaggregated levels.
Yet the results of these studies are not unequivocal. Whereas for instance
Munnell (1990; 1992; 1993) confirm the hypothesis formulated by Aschauer, the
studies by Baltagi (1995a), Garcia-Mila`, McGuire and Porter (1996), Holtz-Eakin
(1994), or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) find no evidence of a significant in-
fluence of infrastructure on productivity for the US.
Authors such as Baltagi (1995a) or Holtz-Eakin (1994) point out that regional
effects should be taken into consideration in econometric examinations on a dis-
aggregated level. Differences between the regions regarding the geographical
location (centre versus periphery), climate or factor endowments can be captured
by econometric techniques using fixed or random cross-sectional effects. Our
study takes this criticism into account in that the econometric methods applied
here are able to estimate such regional-specific influences.
In the literature, when referring to the differentiation of individual areas of in-
frastructure,1 a distinction is made between household-related infrastructure and
business / or business-related infrastructure. Household infrastructure covers
healthcare and educational, leisure and cultural institutions. Road infrastruc-
ture can be placed under the heading of business related infrastructure. Not
only transport belongs under this heading, also energy and water provision and
telecommunications infrastructure are business-related (Frey, 1978). This study
focuses on road infrastructure because comparable data for both the French and
German regions for this section of infrastructure are available.
The purpose of this essay is threefold. First, we survey the institutional frame-
work of infrastructure policy as an instrument of regional policy in Germany and
France. Second, we study the effects of infrastructure on private productivity.
Third, we investigate the determinants of regional infrastructure investment al-
1 Throughout the essay we use the terms ’infrastructure’ and ’public capital’ interchangeable.
Note, however, that in a more rigorous fashion public capital refers to infrastructure services
that are solely publicly financed, whereas the more general term ’infrastructure’ applies also to
privately financed services.
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location.
One contribution of our study to the existing empirical infrastructure liter-
ature is that it simultaneously refers to both French and German regions. The
main advantage of pooling the data for Germany and France is that the database
is expanded and therefore we are able to obtain more reliable estimates of the
parameters of the model. A further contribution is that our study implements
some methodological improvements in comparison with previous investigations
in that the estimations of the effects of infrastructure on French regions are car-
ried out by taking regional-specific effects into account. Another important as-
pect of our study, which has seldom been dealt with in the existing literature, is
that it highlights the different institutional frameworks under which infrastruc-
ture policy is carried out in Germany and France. Finally, our study discusses
and implements a new framework for studying empirically the determinants of
regional infrastructure investment allocation.
The further development of this essay is as follows: In the next subsection,
we provide an overview on related studies. In the second section we compare
regional policies in Germany and France. In addition, some theoretical aspects of
the rationale of regional policies are collated and discussed. In the third section
we present the results of the empirical analysis of the effects of infrastructure on
productivity. Furthermore, an investigation on the empirical determinants of the
allocation of road infrastructure is carried out. In the fourth and final section, the
results of the study are summarised and discussed.
1.1 Related literature
Anumber of investigations into the effects of infrastructure on private production
in Germany have already been carried out (Conrad and Seitz, 1992; Conrad and
Seitz, 1994; Erber, 1995; Hofmann, 1996; Licht and Seitz, 1994; Schlag, 1997; Seitz,
1993; Seitz, 1994; Seitz, 1995; Stephan, 1997). However, as far as we know only
two studies have been undertaken with regard to the impact of infrastructure on
regional development in France (Fritsch, 1995; Prud’Homme, 1996).
The majority of the previous studies with regards to Germany apply a cost
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function approach, only a few studies are based on a production function ap-
proach. The regional and sectoral levels of reference of the respective studies are
sometimes very different, making a comparison of results very difficult. Further-
more, also different measures and definitions of infrastructure and public capital
respectively are used in these studies.
For example Licht and Seitz (1994) examine the economic importance of in-
frastructure at the level of the 11 West German federal states. The method of
investigation is based on a cost function approach. The estimated cost elasticity
for public capital is significant and ranges from -0.01 to -0.36. Also, the studies
by Conrad and Seitz (1992), Seitz (1993), and Conrad and Seitz (1994) confirm the
evidence of cost effects arising from infrastructure at the aggregated level of West
Germany. Erber’s study (1995), which performs the analysis for both Germany
and the US finds only for 4 of 26 branches an influence of the public capital stock
on costs.
In Seitz (1995), 85 self-administrated cities in Germany serve as the regional
level of reference. Significant effects on the cost of private production are found
in this infrastructure study. Hofmann (1996) analyses the effects of public infras-
tructure on productivity applying various econometric methods for Hamburg.
However, no plausible results are obtained so that it is not possible to make con-
clusions about the importance of public infrastructure for Hamburg.
In Stephan (1997), the influence of road infrastructure on production in the
manufacturing industry in the 11West German federal states for the period 1970-
1995 is examined based on a production approach. Using this method, significant
effects of infrastructure are found for almost all specifications.
Schlag (1997) studies the causality link between the public infrastructure cap-
ital and the output of the total business sector in Germany at an aggregate level.
Cointegration analysis is applied and error correction models for time series and
panel data results from Granger causality tests are presented. The results indicate
bi-directional causality (feedback) between the public infrastructure capital and
the output.
Fritsch (1995) estimates a significant effect of infrastructure on productivity
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in 21 French regions. Also Prud’Homme (1996), whose study is likewise based
on the 21 French regions, provides evidence of a significant effect. However,
regional specific effects are not specified in the econometric estimations in both
of these studies.
In sum, so far no clear-cut evidence of the effects of infrastructure on private
productivity emerges from empirical studies carried out for Germany or France.
Whereas a number of studies find significant effects of infrastructure others do
not. However, it is worth pointing out that the results of the different approaches
for testing the significance of infrastructure are hardly comparable due to the
different levels of regional or sectoral reference as well as due to the different def-
initions of infrastructure capital used in the studies. In the following section, we
highlight and discuss the differences between infrastructure policies in Germany
and France. Before that, we provide evidence on the development of regional
income disparities in Germany and France.
2 A comparison of infrastructure policies in Germany and
France
Infrastructure is often used as an instrument for regional economic policies in
order to reduce regional disparities in income. Proponents of active regional eco-
nomic policies maintain that without these state support, disparities in income
will increase between the regions.
Figure 1 shows the development of the regional differences in productivity
in Germany and in France. Regional productivity is measured as gross value
added per worker. For each year, we have calculated the coefficient of variation
for this variable. Note that the coefficient of variation is a unitless measure of
relative variability. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean
expressed as a percentage. If a convergence of regional productivities occurs, the
coefficient of variation will decrease over the course of time.
Figure 1 reveals that although regional differences in productivity decreased
during the period 1970-81, they increased slightly from 1982-86, and following a
further fall during the period 1987-88, have increased again since 1989. There-
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Fig. 1: Regional Productivity Differences for 11West German Bundesla¨nder 1970-
95, 21 French regions 1978-92
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Fig. 2: Regional Differences of Value Added for 11 West German Bundesla¨nder
1970-95, 21 French regions 1978-92
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fore, at least for the period 1976-95, it is not possible to determine a convergence
of regional productivity in Germany. Note, that this result for the 11 West Ger-
man states, which emerges from a rather descriptive analysis, is in line with the
findings of studies using more sophisticated analytical tools e.g. unit root tests
for panel data (Bohl, 1998; Funke and Strulik, 1999).
A similar picture is found for France. Although regional differences decreased
during the period 1979-84 and 1986-90, increases can be seen in the years 1984-85
as well as since 1991. This result that regional convergence can neither be found
for France nor for Germany is also confirmed by Figure 2. Here the coefficients
of variation are calculated based on the logarithms of regional value added. By
taking logarithms of the levels of output the regional absolut differences are trans-
formed into relative percentage differences. Again, we expect a decrease in the
coefficient of variation if a convergence in regional outputs occurs.
In contrast to Figure 1, where in the coefficient of variation the effects of the
development of regional labour force are also included, only the development of
the relative regional output differences is captured in Figure 2 independent of the
development in the labour force (for instance due to labour migration between
regions). Apparently, in the period under investigation neither in France nor in
Germany convergence of regional income is observed.
As a result of this section we state that a decrease in regional disparity in
income can neither be observed in Germany nor in France during the period
1970-1995 and 1978-1991 for France respectively. However, when no regional
convergence can be found in the two countries the question arises whether re-
gional policies were efficient or whether the disparities would have been even
more marked without active regional policies. The following section describes
some important institutional differences in infrastructure and regional policy in
Germany and France.
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2.1 The diﬀerent frameworks of infrastructure policy in
Germany and France
The geographical differences (density of population 104 inhabitants per square
km in France and 223 inhabitants per square km in Germany) highlight the differ-
ing conditions for the forming of infrastructure policy in Germany and in France.
In Germany in 1992 there were a total of 11,000 km of motorway (‘Bundesauto-
bahnen’), 42,000 km A roads (‘Bundesfernstraßen’), 170,140 km B roads (85,200
km ‘Landesstraßen’ and ‘84,940 Kreisstraßen’) and 413,000 km smaller roads and
streets (‘Gemeindestaßen’) (Source: Bundesministerium Fu¨r Verkehr, 1995).
In France there are similarly 5 categories of road: ‘autoroutes’ (motorways),
‘routes nationales’ (A roads), ‘routes de´partementales’ and ‘voies communales’
(B roads) and ‘chemins ruraux’ (smaller roads and streets).
In 1992 the length of the French motorway network was 9,081 km and is there-
fore comparable with the extent of the German system. The length of the ‘routes
nationales’ consisting of 27,500 km is around half the length of the German A
roads. On the other hand, there are 365,600 km of B roads and in addition a net-
work of smaller roads and streets (‘voies communales’) which, with its 579,000
km is clearly longer than in Germany. This can be attributed to the larger geo-
graphical area of France (Centre National de Documentation Pe´dagogique, 1998).
However, not only the geographical differences but also history and politics
have contributed to forming differing infrastructure policies. French infrastruc-
ture policy is on the one hand marked by strong regional policy considerations
and on the other by the emphasis given to individual large infrastructure projects
(Kistenmacher, Marcou and Clev, 1994).
Due to its tradition of political centralism in the first years of the post sec-
ond world war, a markedly interventionist regional policy was approved. For
a long time Paris and the greater Paris area (Ile-de-France) stood in the fore-
ground of regional development. However, in the following years a policy of
de-concentration and the development of industrial centres outside of the area
around Paris was increasingly pursued. The central regional planing institution
DATAR (=De´le´gation a` l’ame´nagement du territoire et a` l’action re´gionale), set
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up in 1963 for this purpose, has wide-reaching decision making powers. In or-
der to improve the carrying out of proactive centrally controlled regional policy
DATAR was put directly under the control of the Prime Minister.
Since the beginning of the 1980’s it has also been possible to observe an in-
creasing tendency towards the decentralisation of planning in France. The hi-
erarchical control of the 1960’s and 1970’s has been superseded in the form of a
contractual agreement between the central state and the regions (Neumann and
Uterwedde, 1994).
Furthermore, the private building and management of motorways plays an
important role. Private or non-profit making firms manage the majority of the
motorway network (6,490 km of a total of 9,081 km) and charge the road users
tolls. Through concessions, the public authorities grant the private firms spe-
cific rights. Not only the maintenance and management of the motorways are
financed by tolls, but the building of further motorways is also financed this way
(Ministe`re de L’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement, 1998).
The ‘Direction des Routes’ is responsible for the financing and planning of the
‘routes nationales’ and the state motorways. This is subordinate to the ministry
responsible (Ministe`re de l’Equipement, des Transports et du Logement). On the
one hand, the ‘Direction des Routes’ sets the targets for road and motorway con-
struction according to a certain scheme (Sche´ma directeur routier national). On
the other hand the ‘Direction des Routes’ enacts laws which determine building,
maintenance and management. Additionally, the determination of the necessary
means for finance is undertaken by the ‘Direction des Routes’. The 22 regions
are therefore represented by the ‘Ministe`re de l’Equipement, des Transports et du
Logement’ (DRE) and are subordinate to the ‘Direction des Routes’.
In Germany, in contrast to France, several regional metropolitan areas of equal
rank have developed over the years (polycentric development). The principle of
federalism played an important role in the forming of regional policy in Germany
during the post-war period. The constitutional law promoting the convergence of
living conditions throughout the regions above all represents an important target
of regional policy.
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As a result of the federal structure, the states have legislative competence for
B roads and smaller roads and streets. On the other hand the federal government
is the owner of and responsible for motorways and A roads; these are built and
administered upon commission from the federal government by the federal states
(Bundesministerium Fu¨r Verkehr, 1995).
In the immediate post-war period, the intention was that the federal govern-
ment would only play a role in setting out the conditions in the planning of re-
gional policies. With the passing of the regional planning law (‘Raumordnungs-
gesetz’) in 1965, the importance of the federal government within the federal sys-
tem was strengthened. Through the federal transport infrastructure plan (‘Bun-
desverkehrswegeplanung’), a transport policy program was introduced which
was supposed to co-ordinate all federal transport (federal roads, federal rail and
federal waterways). Federal transport infrastructure plans were drawn up by the
Federal Cabinet and regularly reformulated. Similar long term transport plan-
ning did not exist in France at the time.
To sum up, we can determine that infrastructure and regional policy in Ger-
many was accompanied by the aim of having similar living standards through-
out the regions, whereas in France during the last few decades, importance was
placed, above all, on decentralisation and the relief of the concentrated area
around Paris. The differences which still exist between infrastructure policy in
Germany and France will, in the future, become less prominent due to the Euro-
pean integration (Kistenmacher, Marcou and Clev, 1996). In the next section some
theoretical considerations regarding the efficiency of regional infrastructure poli-
cies are collated and discussed.
2.2 Can regional policies work in principle? Some preliminary
considerations
The following reflections should serve as a compilation of several arguments
based on economic theory for or against an active role of regional policy. Re-
gional disparities in income often prompt governments to make efforts in order
to achieve a more evenly balanced regional economic development. Tradition-
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ally, public infrastructure policy has been an instrument for regional economic
support. The intention of this policy is to minimise competitive disadvantages
in the regions, and promote private investment through the improvement of re-
gional infrastructure.
According to standard neoclassical growth theory built on the assumption
of decreasing returns to reproducible factors on the other hand, income dispari-
ties arising from differences in regional capital/labour ratios will diminish over
time: both trade and factor flows tend to equalise factor prices. A convergence
of income in the regions would therefore also take place without active regional
policy. Similarly, also the so-called ‘rule of thumb’ of a 2 percent convergence
rate according to empirical studies based on neoclassical growth theory leaves no
scope for an active role of regional policy (for an overview, see Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1995).
Apparently, the presence of externalities (spill-over effects) can give objective
reasons for regional economic support. For instance, if negative ‘crowding’ ex-
ternalities exist in economically better developed regions, these can be mitigated
by regional policies which provide infrastructure to economically less developed
regions, so that labour migration from the less to the better developed regions is
prevented and externalities thus reduced.
However, according to Homburg (1993) even in the absence of externalities
active regional distribution policies can be justified. To analyse the consequences
of regional distribution policies, Homburg’s model assumes a neoclassical pro-
duction function Qi = f (Gi,Ki,Li), i = 1 . . .N, linear homogenous of degree one,
where Qi is region i’s output, Gi is the stock of public capital in region i, Ki is the
stock of private capital in region i, and Li is an immobile factor of production in
region i, e.g. land endowment, geographical characteristics etc.
The steady state of themodel is described by the two conditions: (i) τQi = δGi,
where τ denotes the tax rate, δ denotes the depreciation rate of public capital,
and (ii) (1− τ)FiK = r + δ, where FiK denotes the marginal productivity of private
capital for region i and r the exogenous rate of interest. Condition (i) states that
in steady state taxes are only used to finance replacement of Gi, and condition (ii)
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states that the marginal after-tax productivity of private capital equals the rental
price of private capital r + δ.
Homburg (1993) shows that a spatial efficient allocation of infrastructure can be
regarded as a maximisation of the joint total output ∑Qi given the sum of stocks
of private capital∑Ki and given the sum of endowments with infrastructure ∑Gi.
The spatial efficient allocation of infrastructure solves the followingmaximisation
problem
max!∑Qi, given ∑Ki = K and ∑Gi = G. (1)
It can be shown that the condition for the spatial efficient allocation applies ex-
actly when the marginal productivities of infrastructure FiG and private capital F
i
K
in all regions are given as
FiG = µ and F
i
K = θ for all i.
This means that the marginal productivities of private and public capital are
equal for all regions. If public and private capital is also homogeneous in a neo-
classical sense, then furthermore µ = θ should also apply. From this result we can
state that under neoclassical assumptions it would be optimal to allocate infras-
tructure investment in such a way across regions that the marginal productivity
of infrastructure is equal in all regions.
An important result of this model is that the spatial efficiency criterion is valid
whether the total endowment with infrastructure is optimal or sub-optimal. If
the assumptions of the model apply, then an efficient spatial allocation of infras-
tructure is observed in the steady-state equilibrium even without governmental
subsidies. However, as Homburg shows in his further analysis, the adjustment
processes to this efficient steady state equilibrium is characterised by an ineffi-
cient spatial allocation. This implies that the adjustment path can be improved
upon by means of using intergovernmental grants.
As the main result therefore we can state that if the initial allocation of in-
frastructure stocks of infrastructure across the regions is unbalanced, the joint
national product can be increased by a regional infrastructure policy. The tar-
get of such a policy should be to balance the ratio of output Qi to infrastructure
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stock Gi in all regions, i.e. to equalise the marginal productivities of infrastructure
across regions.
However, it should be noted that studies such as Martin (1998; 1999) or Otta-
viano and Thisse (1999) arrive at different results regarding the possible effects
of regional infrastructure policy. These models of the ‘New Economic Geogra-
phy’ predict that the consequences of a policy which targets at the achievement
of a balanced spatial allocation of economic activity can result even in greater
regional disparities. The mechanism behind this result is that the reduction of
transport costs, for example by means of improved transport infrastructure, can
have negative effects on the economic development of poorer regions. This will
happen if companies from the poorer regions move to take advantage of the ag-
glomeration and scale economics in centrally located regions while at the same
time, however, they can maintain their sales outlets in the poorer regions due to
the reduced transport costs.
In the next section we analyse empirically whether investment in road infras-
tructure has a positive effect on economic development. For this purpose, an
econometric analysis is carried out based on a production function with panel
data for the French regions and the German federal states.
3 Empirical analysis
The first part of the empirical analysis deals with the productivity effects of in-
frastructure. In the second part, we investigate the determinants of the regional
allocation of infrastructure investment.
3.1 Productivity eﬀects of regional road infrastructure in
Germany and France
The central hypothesis to be examined empirically is that infrastructure increases
private output or reduces respectively the costs for a given unit of output. From
a theoretical point of view, this can be the case when infrastructure either directly
exerts a positive effect on private factor productivities or indirectly exerts a posi-
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tive influence on private factor productivities which in turn increases the demand
for private factor inputs (Aschauer, 1995).
In the following section, the effects of road infrastructure on productivity are
examined using two different approaches
1. Cobb-Douglas production function
2. Transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function according to
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971; 1973).
For the estimations, we employ econometric methods from panel data anal-
ysis by specifying fixed cross-sectional effects (Baltagi, 1995b; Hsiao, 1986). For
the first approach, our empirical model is based on the production function for
region i, i = 1 . . .N, in year t, t = 1 . . . T,
Qit = Ait(t)F(t,X1it , . . . ,XMit), (2)
where Qit describes output, Ait(t) technical efficiency (or the Hicks-neutral tech-
nical progress) and X1it, . . . ,XMit describe the M factors of production. Assuming
a Cobb-Douglas production technology and with factor inputs labour Lit, private
capital Kit and road infrastructure Git and after taking logarithms and dividing
by Lit, we obtain the following empirical model is obtained which forms the basis
of our empirical assessment
ln qit = ln A0i +αtt +αk ln kit +αg ln git + α˜L ln Lit + uit, (3)
uit = ρui,t−1 +it − γit−1,
and α˜L = αk +αg +αL − 1,
where uit follows an autoregressive moving average process ARMA(1,1) and it
denotes normal i.i.d. distributed random innovations. In addition, we assume
that Ait(t) = A0iexp(αtt). Note that variables in lower-case letters in (3) are de-
fined as x = X/L. The parameters αk, αg,αL describe the elasticity of the output
Qit with respect to inputs Kit, Git and Lit.
The advantage of this specification for the production function is that by di-
viding (2) by Lit the problem of heteroscedasticity for the empirical estimation
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is reduced. Notice also that no ‘a priori’ restrictions are placed on (3) regarding
returns to scale. If the parameter α˜L is significantly different from zero, then the
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected.
Table 1 contains the results for the Cobb-Douglas production function which
has been estimated by using the procedure PROC MIXED in SAS V8. A detailed
description of the data used in this analysis can be found in the Appendix.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is applied to all specifications based
on a total of 596 observations (281 for Germany and 315 for France). The main
benefit of pooling the data for France and Germany is that the analysis can be
based on a larger data set and therefore more reliable estimates of the parameters
of the model are obtained.
In column (1), the model is estimated assuming heterogenous parameters for
German and French regions. Note, that in contrast to Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation the parameters in column (1) are different due to the specified
covariance structure from parameters that would be obtained by running two
separate regressions for German and French regions.
In column (2), we assume parameter homogeneity for German and French
regions except for the covariance parameters ρ and γ. That means that the spec-
ification in column (2) can be deduced from column (1) by imposing restrictions
with respect to parameter homogeneity on the specification of column (1). Fur-
thermore, in column (3), except for labour and the covariance parameters ρ and
γ, parameter homogeneity across German and French regions is assumed.
Note, that fixed cross-section effects are added to all specifications (1)-(3) of Ta-
ble 1. The results of likelihood ratio (LR) tests not reported here imply that these
fixed cross-section effects are significantly different from zero. Also, because a
linear time trend t is included in eq. (3), it is not possible to estimate additional
time effects due to the resulting singularity.
The ARMA(1,1) parameters ρ and γ for both Germany and France are signif-
icantly different from zero for all specifications. The model selection criteria AIC
and SBC, which we describe below indicate that these specifications are preferred
compared with AR(1) alternatives not reported here. The displayed ‘null model
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Tab. 1: Regression Results for the Productivity Effects of Road Infrastructure
Maximum-Likelihood Estimations (MLE)
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept fixed effects fixed effects fixed effects
0.01141 (6.88)
t
0.01412 (7.74)
0.0151 (12.93) 0.0133 (10.67)
0.23101 (3.03)
ln k
0.12542 (3.36)
0.1162 (3.55) 0.1457 (4.28)
0.08281 (1.32)
ln g
0.12822 (2.13)
0.0837 (2.12) 0.1120 (2.79)
0.34551 (3.56) 0.27841 (3.18)
ln L
-0.29322 (-3.39)
-0.0588 (-0.94)
-0.33372 (-4.14)
0.78571 (16.79) 0.83701 (20.96) 0.81721 (18.99)
AR(1) ρ
0.58882 (7.08) 0.52572 (6.15) 0.63032 (8.29)
0.84771 (29.35) 0.88231 (34.55) 0.86781 (31.59)
MA(1) γ
0.64312 (12.89) 0.59772 (12.08) 0.66862 (13.69)
Null Model
LR Test χ2
447.9 504.1 506.4
Log-
Likelihood
1531.2 1514.8 1528.7
AIC 1485.2 1472.8 1485.7
SBC 1451.5 1442.0 1454.2
2811 2811 2811
Observ.
3152 3152 3152
Parameters for 1German regions, 2French regions, otherwise for both regions (homogenous).
Approx. t-statistics are given in parentheses. Significance levels: 10 %, 5 %, 1 %.
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (regional value added / labour).
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likelihood ratio test’ checks the model without covariance parameters against
the alternative of the specified ARMA(1,1) covariance structure. Thus, the ‘null
model’ without covariance structure parameters is rejected for each of the three
specifications (1)-(3).
In column (1) of Table 1, the estimates of the parameters of the input factors
k, g and L are statistically significant for the French regions. For the German
‘Bundesla¨nder’ (federal states), estimates of the parameters of input factors k and
L are statistically significant, however not for g. Note, that constant returns to
scale are rejected both for German as well as for French regions.
In column (2), a decrease in the value of the log likelihood from 1531.2 in
column (1) to 1514.8 in (2) can be observed. Indeed, the LR test for the re-
striction of parameter homogeneity, −2[1514.8 − 1531.2] = 32.8  χ2(4), is
highly significant, thus the null hypothesis of parameter homogeneity across Ger-
man and French regions is rejected. This is also reflected in the decrease of the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974), which has been computed as
AIC= l(θ̂)− d, where l(θ̂) is the maximised log likelihood and d is the effective
number of parameters (fixed effects and covariance parameters). It can be used to
compare different models; the model with the largest AIC is deemed best. Sim-
ilarly, Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (SBC) (Schwarz, 1978) has been computed
as SBC= l(θ̂) − 12d log N, where N equals the number of valid observations for
maximum likelihood estimation. Again, models with larger SBC are preferred,
but note also that SBC penalises models with a greater number of parameters
more than AIC does, that means it will lean toward a simpler model. Therefore,
the specification of column (1) is preferred compared to (2) by both criteria.
However, the rejection of specification (2) is mainly driven by the heterogene-
ity of the parameter for labour betweenGerman and French regions. Therefore, in
column (3) we allow for this heterogeneity, whereas the other parameters (except
the covariance parameters) are restricted to be equal across German and French
regions. In contrast to column (2), this specification is not rejected by the LR test,
−2[1528.7 − 1531.2] = 5  χ2(3). Furthermore, also the AIC and SBC criteria
are higher than for column (1). Thus, we conclude that column (3) contains the
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results of the preferred specification of the empirical model. We find that the
time trend t with a value of 0.0133 is significant, and private and public capital is
significant with values of 0.1457 and 0.1120 respectively. In sum, the main find-
ing of the performed analysis is that road infrastructure is significant for private
production at the regional level.
However, the Cobb-Douglas production function approach restricts the elas-
ticities of input substitution to equal one. In order to overcome this limitation,
our second approach is based on a translog production function
lnQit = ln A0it +αtt +αk lnKit +αg lnGit +αL ln Lit
+αkg lnKit lnGit +αkl lnKit ln Lit +αgl lnGit ln Lit
0.5
[
αkk ln 2Kit +αgg ln 2Git +αll ln 2Lit
]
+it, (4)
uit = ρui,t−1 +it − γit−1.
Again, we assume that uit follows an autoregressive moving average pro-
cess ARMA(1,1). The effect from public input G on private factor productivities,
i.e. ∂2Q/∂K∂G and ∂2Q/∂L∂G, can be derived from the estimates of equation (4)
as
α̂kg =
∂2 lnQ
∂ lnQ∂ ln K , and α̂gl =
∂2 lnQ
∂ lnG∂ ln L , (5)
from which ∂2Q/∂K∂G and ∂2Q/∂L∂G can be computed as
∂2Q
∂K∂G = α̂kg
Q
KG
, and
∂2Q
∂G L = α̂gl
Q
G L
. (6)
Since the ratios Q/KG and Q/GL are positive, we can infer from the signs of
α̂kg and α̂gl whether the effect of G on private factor productivities is positive or
negative respectively.
Furthermore, several restrictions on the production technology can be tested
within a translog function framework. If technology is homogeneous, then the
sum of the coefficients of the squared terms and the cross-effects will be zero
m
∑
p
m
∑
l
α̂pl = 0, (7)
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where p, l ∈ {K,G, L}, m = 3. In addition, linear homogeneity requires the above
condition plus that the sum of the linear terms equals one (Chambers, 1988)
m
∑
p
α̂p = 1. (8)
We obtain the following results for the translog production function approach
l̂nQit = fixed effects

+0.014 t −0.445 lnKit +0.740 lnGit −0.659 ln Lit
(11.70) (−1.16) (2.20) (−1.53)
−0.106 ln Kit lnGit −0.362 lnKit ln Lit −0.143 lnGit ln Lit
(−1.19) (5.29) (−2.31)
+0.096 ln 2Kit +0.176 ln 2Git −0.198 ln 2Lit
(−0.83) (2.00) (−2.16)
N : 596 Log-Likelihood: 1536.9 AIC: 1488.9 SBC: 1453.8
The value of the LR statistic, −2[1514.8 − 1536.9] = 44.2  χ2(6), which is
highly significant, shows that due to the addition of cross and quadratic terms
the translog model is preferred compared with the Cobb-Douglas specification in
column (2) of table 1 (however, it is not preferred according to the SBC criterion).
Again, we find that infrastructure Git is significant. Moreover, with respect to
marginal productivities inputs Git and Lit are substitutes (αgl = −0.143), whereas
Git and Kit appear not to affect each other (αkg is insignificant).
However, it should be mentioned that the results of the translog specification
should be interpreted with some caution due to the high correlation of the single
with the quadratic and the cross terms. The correlations not reported here be-
tween the single and the cross and quadratic terms are greater than 0.8 for most
of the cross and quadratic terms. Due to this high degree of multicollinearity
between the explanatory variables, imprecise or even estimates with implausible
signs can result (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lee and Lu¨tkepohl, 1985, chap. 22). Finally,
note that by applying LR tests, linear homogeneity is rejected for the estimated
translog production function.
It can be summarised that our empirical analysis finds evidence that regional
road infrastructure has a significant impact on regional output. The specification
with heterogenous parameters between German and French regions appears to
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indicate that the effect of road infrastructure on productivity is significant only for
France. However, by pooling the data for Germany and France we obtain more
efficient and reliable parameter estimates. Thus, the model with heterogenous
parameters is rejected and the specification where only for labour heterogeneity
of parameters is assumed is deemed best. In the following section, the determi-
nants of the regional allocation of road infrastructure in Germany and France are
analysed.
3.2 Empirical determinants of the regional allocation of road
infrastructure investment
Figure 3 shows the variation in the allocation of regional road infrastructure in-
vestment in Germany and in France. Again, the development of the variation
is expressed in terms of the coefficient of variation calculated for each year. For
Germany, the variation increased relatively constant in the period 1972-89, but
decreased after 1990. This is probably a result of the German reunification af-
ter which priority was given to improvements of infrastructure in East German
regions, whereas differences of infrastructure investment in the West German re-
gions are levelled out due to budget constraints.
With regards to France, neither a constant increase nor decrease can be ob-
served. This means that the variation of the investment allocation remains rela-
tively constant with the course of time. Considered on the whole, no decrease in
the variation of the allocation can be identified for both countries.
According to expectations from neoclassical theory this finding is surprising
since in the long-run infrastructure endowments across regions should become
more balanced and therefore the variation in the regional allocation of infrastruc-
ture should decrease in the course of time. However, this only applies if the gov-
ernment actually aims at equalising the marginal productivities of infrastructure
across regions. Therefore, in the following we examine the empirical determi-
nants of the allocation of infrastructure investment across regions.
De La Fuente and Vives (1995) identify three criteria which could be of rele-
vance for the regional allocation of public investment in road infrastructure. If the
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Fig. 3: Regional Differences of Road Infrastructure Investment in Germany and
France
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government strives for equal living standards in all regions, then according to the
first criterion, labelled equality, investment in infrastructure should be directed to
where the regional per capita income or productivity respectively is below aver-
age. The aim of such a policy would be to reduce competitive disadvantage in
a region by improving the public infrastructure and thereby to attracting private
investment. In order to operationalise the equality criterion empirically, we use
the labour productivity Qi/Li as a measure for regional income differences.
According to the second criterion, which is labelled as efficiency criterion, in-
frastructure investment should flow where the marginal productivity of invest-
ment is highest. Thus the objective of this criterion would be to maximise the sum
of regional incomes. In order to obtain an empirical measure for this criterion, by
assuming a linear homogenous production function F of degree one the marginal
productivity ∂F/∂Gi of the infrastructure capital stock in region i is proportional
to the ratio of the output Qi to the infrastructure stock Gi, i.e.
∂F
∂Gi
∼ Qi
Gi
.
Thus, we use the ratio Qi/Gi as an operational measure for a regional infrastruc-
ture policy criterion according to the efficiency criterion.
A third criterion for the allocation of investment in infrastructure can be la-
belled as neutrality. The rationale for this criterion is that the state should ensure
that differences in public capital stocks do not give an unfair advantage or disad-
vantage to any region. The goal of this policy would be to equalise the infrastruc-
ture endowments across regions. In practice, this criterion would be met when
for example Gi/Li, i.e. the capital intensity of infrastructure (or any other region-
ally comparable measure for infrastructure endowment), is equal in all regions.
If a government intends to apply these criteria to the decision process of re-
gional investment allocation, in most cases these three criteria cannot be fulfilled
simultaneously. On the contrary, they will quite often lead to conflicting priori-
ties regarding the ranking of infrastructure investment projects. For the Spanish
regions, for example, De La Fuente and Vives (1995) find a conflict between the ef-
ficiency criterion on the one hand, and the neutrality criterion and equality criterion
on the other hand.
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Table 2 shows the results of a regression of Iit/Lit, i.e. investment per labour
as a measure for the regional allocation of infrastructure investment, on the mea-
sures for the three criteria equality, efficiency and neutrality described above. Fur-
thermore, we have also added a measure for private capital intensity, i.e. Kit/Lit,
which is another potential determinant of regional infrastructure investment.
Note, that infrastructure investment is measured in net figures in order to re-
duce the size effect in the allocation of investment, due to the fact that higher
stocks also require higher maintenance investment which is reflected in higher
gross investment figures.
One important issue for the implementation is that at least for Germany, in-
vestment of different levels of governments, i.e. the Federal government, the gov-
ernments of the federal states and the local governments of the counties, are in-
cluded. One could argue that the autonomous investment decisions at lower
governmental levels are unlikely to reflect especially the equality and neutrality
criteria, whereas the efficiency criterion should be also relevant for investment un-
dertaken by lower levels of government. However, investment by the federal
government is not only the main part of total infrastructure investment, but the
federal government can also influence investment decisions at lower government
levels via its investment grant policy. Thus, we argue that this investment figures
including all levels of government are appropriate for the problem of regional
investment allocation we study here.
In case the government pursues a regional infrastructure policy according to
the neutrality criterion, we expect a negative correlation between the investment
per person in work (Iit/Lit) and the infrastructure intensity (Git/Lit). A negative
correlation between (Iit/Lit) and (Qit/Lit) is expected if the government allocates
investment according to the criterion of equality. Hence, regions with lower in-
come will receive more investment. Finally, if the government pursues a regional
infrastructure policy according to the criterion of efficiency, then we expect the
correlation between (Iit/Lit) and (Qit/Git) to be positive. Thus, regions where the
expected returns of infrastructure investments are higher would obtain more in-
vestment.
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Tab. 2: Determinants of Regional Infrastructure Investment Allocation in Ger-
many and France
Results of the regression analysis:
Dependent variable: I/L
(1) Germany (2) France
Independent variables:
Equity Y/L (0) (0)
Efficiency Q/G (0) (0)
Neutrality G/L (−) (+)
Private Capital K/L (0) (0)
Significance levels: 1%,5%,10%
(0) not significant, (+) with positive sign, (-) with negative sign
The estimation of the regression in Table 2 has been carried out separately for
the German and the French regions by again usingMLEwith an ARMA(1,1) spec-
ification for the covariance structure. Also, fixed cross-section and time-effects
were added to the specification, which turned out to be highly significant.
From the results reported in Table 2, we find that only the criterion of neutral-
ity can explain differences in the amount of infrastructure investment the regions
receive, but only for Germany it has the expected sign. This finding fits well
into the institutional framework of infrastructure policy in Germany we have
described in section 2.1 where priority is given to the convergence of living con-
ditions throughout all regions in Germany. For France, a potential explanation
for the positive sign of the criterion of neutrality is that in the process of decon-
centration of the Paris region, political priorities are given to the development of
certain regions, but not to the development of all regions with equal priority.
On the other hand, surprisingly neither the criterion of efficiency nor the pri-
vate capital intensity are significant for Germany or France. Thus, governments
do not seem to anticipate the expected returns of infrastructure investments in
the decision process. Moreover, the equity criterion is not significant. As a by-
product of this result we can also infer that—contrary to what is often presumed
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in the literature—simultaneity between infrastructure investment and output is
negligible, i.e. Qit/Lit does not determine Iit/Lit. It is worth noting that if simul-
taneity matters we expect a positive sign for Qit/Lit, because prosperous states
are financially more capable of infrastructure spending than poorer ones.
As a result of this sectionwe can determine on balance that, contrary to France,
the criterion of neutrality does appear to play a role in the allocation of public in-
frastructure investment in Germany. Public investment in Germany has flowed
above all into regions with a below average initial endowment of road infrastruc-
ture, thus in Germany infrastructure policy is used as an instrument of regional
policy to minimise the competitive disadvantages of economically underdevel-
oped regions.
4 Summary and conclusions
In the first part of this study, we described the differences in infrastructure and
regional planning policies between Germany and France. In France, for exam-
ple, a dominance of Paris and the surrounding region compared to the other
French regions can be observed. A further basic difference is that regional plan-
ning in Germany is divided hierarchically between the regional authorities and
is conceived in the medium to long-term. In contrast to this, regional planning
in France is based on so called ‘planning contracts’ between the state and the
regions, in which the individual regional authorities have equal rights and plan-
ning is conceived rather in the medium to short-term.
Following the description of the institutional concepts of regional infrastruc-
ture policy in Germany and France, the effects of road infrastructure on produc-
tivity were examined for the German and French regions in the second part of this
study. For that purpose, production functions were estimated using the data of
an ‘unbalanced panel’ consisting of the 21 French regions for the period 1978-92
and the 11 West German federal states for the period 1970-95.
On the whole it can be concluded that regional road infrastructure has a sig-
nificant impact on regional output. In addition, we find evidence that the direct
effect arising from infrastructure, i.e. increasing the marginal productivities of
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private factors, is more important than the indirect effects, i.e. the positive effects
on the demand for private factor inputs. As a caveat, however, the results regard-
ing the indirect effects of infrastructure should be interpreted with some caution
due to the strong correlation between the explanatory variables in the translog
model.
In addition, we cannot observe a decrease in income disparities in the pe-
riod of investigation either in Germany or France. This finding is at odds with
the predictions of neoclassical economic theories. On the contrary, economic
counter-effects could have emanated that worked against regional convergence
as assumed by models of the ‘New Economic Geography’ due to the removal
of transport barriers. The explanation of this puzzling evidence is a challenging
issue for future research.
Finally, the determinants of the allocation of infrastructure investment in Ger-
many and France were examined empirically by applying a new approach. Sur-
prisingly, neither in France or Germany do efficiency considerations matter for
the allocation of infrastructure investment across regions. However, it could be
shown that in Germany, in contrast with France, the criterion of neutrality plays
a role in the allocation of public investment in infrastructure, which means that
public investment flows above all to those regions which have a below average
endowment with public capital. Despite the principal difficulty to link the in-
stitutional differences in infrastructure policies in Germany and France with this
evidence of the determinants of infrastructure investment allocation, we interpret
this finding as a reflection of the priority of promoting the regional convergence
of living conditions for infrastructure policy in Germany.
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Appendix
A Data
The German-French regional data include 21 of the 22 French regions (Corsica
was not included due to incomplete statistical information) for the period 1978-
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1992 and 11 West German federal states for the period 1970-1995 although in the
case of West Berlin data is only available for the period 1970-1990.2 All values
have been converted into ECU at constant 1991 prices. For investment in trans-
port infrastructure, we are able to differentiate in France between roads, rail and
inland waterways. The infrastructure data for France are also described in Fritsch
(1995) and Cadot, Ro¨ller and Stephan (1999). Note, that road infrastructure in-
vestment in France includes both public investment for all road categories and
private investment for licensed motorways.
In the case of Germany, with respect to transport infrastructure only invest-
ment data for road infrastructure are available at the regional level of the Bun-
desla¨nder. Therefore, in order to allow a comparison of the infrastructure data
between Germany and France, the empirical analysis focuses on road infrastruc-
ture.
For Germany we are able to differentiate investment between categories of
road (A roads, B roads and smaller roads and streets). An internal report of the
GermanMinistry of Transport, Building andHousingwas used as a source for the
investment made by the Federal Government and the Federal States (‘Straßen-
baubericht 1996’). Thus, this report gives the allocation of Federal investment for
motorways and A roads across the Bundesla¨nder in the period 1970-1995.
The information regarding investment made by the State and local gov-
ernments in B and smaller roads was taken from a publication published by
the Federal Statistical Office Wiesbaden ‘Rechnungsergebnisse des o¨ffentlichen
Gesamthaushalts’, series 14, Reihe 3.1. It contains the road investment of the dif-
ferent bodies at the regional level of the Bundesla¨nder.
The regional capital stocks of road infrastructure in Germany and France were
determined from the regional investment series (French regions 1975-1992, Ger-
man Bundesla¨nder) using the ‘Perpetual Inventory method’ (PIM). Different pro-
cedures were used for both Germany and France. The problem in the case of
France was to determine the initial capital stock for 1975 for each region. Thus
the aggregated transport infrastructure stocks in France as given by the Feder-
2 The data used in this analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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ation Nationale des Travaux Publics (FNTP) have been allocated proportionally
to the individual regions in accordance with the investment proportion of the in-
dividual regions. The calculated value was then used as the initial stock for the
Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). For the linear depreciation rate we assumed
a value of 2.5 percent. As a control for the capital stocks of road infrastructure ar-
rived at by using this method, the sum over the individual regions was computed
and compared with the aggregated value reported by FNTP. It became apparent
that the deviation between the sums of the regional and the aggregated stock was
only between 1 and 2 percent.
In contrast to this method applied for France, in the case of Germany it is pos-
sible to use a study carried out by the German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW), in which the regional capital stock of road infrastructure was estimated
for the West German federal states for the year 1970 (Bartholmai, 1973). In order
to update the initial stocks for 1970 over the period 1971-1995 the Perpetual In-
ventory Method was used. The publication series ‘Verkehr in Zahlen’ (Transport
in figures) of the DIW also gives the aggregated stock of road infrastructure for
the period 1970-1995. Therefore it was possible to apply a restriction for the calcu-
lation of the regional stock. Contained within this restriction was the assumption
that the sum of the stocks in the regions equals the aggregated value for Germany
given by DIW.
Furthermore, the majority of regionally specific measures were obtained from
official statistics such as value added as a measure for output we use in the anal-
ysis. In the case of Germany, the majority of this data originates from the series
of ‘National Accounts for the Bundesla¨nder’ which is published by the Statistical
Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (‘Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Wu¨rttemberg’).
Gross value added (for all areas at market prices) is taken from the publica-
tion ‘Entstehung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts in den La¨ndern der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1979-1996’ (‘The Origin of Gross National Product in the Federal
States of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1970-1996’), vol. 30, and is used as a
measure for the output Q of the federal states for the period 1979-1995.
For France, the measure for labour has been taken from the EUROSTAT data
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base ‘New Cronos’, June edition 1999. The regional value added data at mar-
ket prices for the years 1980-1992 were drawn from the EUROSTAT publications
‘Regional and Statistical Yearbook, Series 1A, 1993, 1995.’ The values for 1979
and 1978 were extrapolated using the information of the development of gross
domestic product (GDP) for the years 1978 and 1979.
The data relating to the regional stock of private capital in France for the pe-
riod 1978-1991 were provided to us by Professor Remy Prud’Homme of the Uni-
versity of Paris. A description of these data can be found in Prud’Homme (1996).
The stocks for the year 1992 were computed by applying the Perpetual Inven-
tory Method from the stocks in 1991 by adding regional gross investment in 1992
for all industries taken from the ‘New Cronos’ data base and assuming a linear
depreciation rate of 10 percent.
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